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Introduction 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the political landscape in Eu- 
rope and transformed the membership and role of Europe's two major or- 
ganisations—the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE). 
The nature of these organisations' relationships with post-Soviet states and 
with each other received considerable scholarly interest in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Originally founded as alternatives, the EU and the CoE "have 
run in parallel for most of the time, each within its very own field of activity" 
(Kolb, 2010, p. 2). Following the decades of transformation, however, the 
two found themselves pursuing similar tasks in similar fields: promoting the 
triptych of European values –democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law—in post-Soviet states. Scholars examined transforming networks of "in- 
terlocking" European organisations and concluded that there are increasing 
overlaps of their memberships and competences, with elements of both co- 
operation and competition (see Baracani, 2008; Bartole, 2000; Dimitrova & 
Pridham, 2004; Guetzkow, 1998; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2004; Peters, 
1996; Strohal, 2005). In the last decade, the political and developmental 
context in Europe altered once again, due to the maturing of the EU as an 
actor and the new quality of EU relations with post-Soviet states after the 
2004 and 2007 EU enlargements. The EU value promotion discourse solidi- 
fied, development assistance funds grew, and interest, presence and en- 
gagement in the region intensified. Post-Soviet states themselves devel- 
oped an interest in EU, all the way to membership aspirations for some, giv- 
ing the EU greater political weight. The CoE also expanded its membership 
and competences in the last decade, but not as dramatically as the EU. 
Acknowledging these changes, this study revisits the relationship between 
the EU and the CoE as promoters of European values in post-Soviet states. 
To provide empirical detail and analytical depth, the study examines a sin- 
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gle case: rule of law promotion efforts of the two organisations in Ukraine.1 
The rule of law is extracted from the basket of shared European values for 
two reasons. First, the rule of law has been visibly mainstreamed inside 
both the EU2 and the CoE3 over the last twenty years. Second, rule of law 
compliance, or rather drastic rule of law incompliance, in post-Soviet states 
constitutes a great challenge for domestic reformers and a major concern 
for external actors. Ukraine is selected among post-Soviet states for its 
elaborate relationships with both the EU and the CoE, which have engaged 
in extensive rule of law promotion efforts in this country. Moreover, 
Ukraine's formal aspirations of EU membership give the EU additional polit- 
ical leverage, affecting the EU-CoE relationship.4 It should be emphasised 
that this case study research strategy is used instrumentally to investigate 
in-depth the general phenomenon, the relationship between the EU and the 
CoE as promoters of European values in post-Soviet states, inasmuch as it 
examines rule of law promotion in the Ukrainian case in particular. 
 
 
 
 
1 Rule of law promotion efforts of the OSCE, the UN, the OECD, International Finan- 
cial Institutions and individual states (in particular, USA and EU Member States), as 
well as the relationship between them and the EU/the CoE are not addressed by 
this study due to scope limitations, without prejudice to their effect on developments 
in post-Soviet states and Ukraine in particular. 
2 Rule of law clauses occupy a solid place in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 
and permeate EU internal and external policies, including relevant framework poli- 
cies (the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership) and policies 
specifically towards Ukraine (Burlyuk, 2014b). 
3 In 2005, the CoE, the OSCE and the UN adopted a "Multilateral organizations rule 
of law pledge"; in 2007, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) adopted a resolution "The principle of the rule of law" (1594/2007); in 2008, 
Rapporteur Group on Legal Co-operation issued a report "The Council of Europe 
and the rule of law: an overview" (GR-J(2008)11); in 2011, Venice Commission 
adopted a "Report on the rule of law" (2011-003.rev); and due to the latest restruc- 
turing, the rule of law now is featured not only in the titles of CoE programmes, but 
also in the title of Directorate General I – Human Rights and Rule of Law. 
4 For the first time, Ukraine declared its intention to develop relations with the EU 
based on the principles of integration leading to full membership in the Decision of 
the Parliament of Ukraine "On key directions of the foreign policy of Ukraine" on July 
2nd, 1993. At the same time, formal aspirations most of the time do not match the at- 
titude and performance behind them, which made scholars speak of "integration by 
declaration" (Sherr, 1998, p. 12) and "integration  without  Europeanisation" 
(Wolczuk, 2004, p. 2) as strategies of the Ukrainian political elites. 
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The main objective of this study is to explore and conceptualise the com- 
plex nature of the EU-CoE relationship. The existing scholarship on the 
subject revolves around the competition-cooperation dichotomy5 and con- 
cludes that the EU and the CoE are simultaneously involved in a conflictive 
and cooperative relationship (Kolb, 2013). Recognising that "relations be- 
tween international organizations are, as a rule, based on both co-operation 
and competition" (Rotfeld, 2000, p. 377), this study aims to enrich the de- 
bate empirically and analytically by revealing and conceptualising the rela- 
tionship's nuances in the studied case. The investigation focuses on the 
substance and process of EU and CoE rule of law promotion.6 The ele- 
ments of comparison notwithstanding, this is not a comparative study as 
such: the main objective is to analyse how and why the two actors interact 
in the shared field of rule of law promotion. The analysis draws on original 
empirical data collected through document analysis; semi-structured inter- 
views with EU and CoE officials (working on rule of law promotion in the re- 
gion or cooperation between the two organisations) and experts (working 
for these and other development actors) in Ukraine; and participant obser- 
vation at policy events, panel discussions and EU/CoE project conferences. 
Data collected through expert interviews and participant observation are 
especially valuable for exposing informal details, attitudes and perceptions 
that add nuance to understanding the relationship between the EU and the 
CoE. 
 
The findings reaffirm that the EU and the CoE as rule of law promoters in 
Ukraine are in a complex interactive relationship, with elements of both co- 
operation and competition. In addition to this, the findings reveal three im- 
portant details (or tendencies) in their relationship: first, cooperation prevails 
over competition at substantive, political and operational levels, while com- 
petition is concentrated at the institutional level; second, cooperation at the 
 
5 Many contributions include the dichotomy in the very title (e.g. De Schutter, 2007; 
Kolb, 2010, 2011; Polakiewicz, 2009). 
6 That is to say, this study does not investigate actors' motivations to promote the rule 
of law. It assumes the aspiration of the EU and the CoE to make a positive impact, 
but does not imply altruism behind such an aspiration and allows for their engage- 
ment to be driven by "enlightened self-interest" (Whitman & Wolff, 2010, p. 7). This 
study also does not investigate the impact of their efforts as such. The impact is a 
feature in the analysis only in so far as concerns about impact inform actors' deci- 
sions on the substance and process of their engagement. 
180 OLGA BURLYUK  
 
 
 
political and operational levels precedes and even triggers cooperation at 
the institutional level, bending the reluctant institutional structures of the two 
organisations; and, third, the growing political, financial and normative lead- 
ership of the EU does not cancel out the traditional and special relevance of 
the CoE in this region and policy area. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section examines the quest for 
normative leadership given substantive overlap in the value agendas of the 
two actors. The second section explores how this substantive overlap in 
value agendas leads to operational overlap in actors' areas of actual en- 
gagement. The third section analyses why, despite such substantive and 
operational overlap, there is more cooperation than competition between 
the two actors, concluding on a determinant role of the unity of their "civilis- 
ing mission", or political overlap. The fourth section examines how the limit- 
edness of resources and the complementarity of comparative advantages 
of the two organisations make them natural key partners for each other. Fi- 
nally, the fifth section addresses an observation that the inevitability of co- 
operation at political and operational levels triggers cooperation at the insti- 
tutional level. The findings' implications for future research and policy are 
stipulated in the concluding section. 
 
 
Value agenda, substantive overlap and the quest 
for normative leadership 
 
First of all, the obvious: the EU is a latecomer in the field of rule of law pro- 
motion, in Ukraine and globally. Ukraine acceded to the CoE on the 9th of 
November, 1995, is a participant of the Venice Commission since February 
3rd, 1997, and falls under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights since September 11th, 1997. In contrast, the EU engagement in 
Ukraine became more or less active and deliberate only in 2004–2005, fol- 
lowing the Eastern enlargement, the introduction of the European Neigh- 
bourhood Policy (ENP) and the so-called Orange Revolution. Until then, the 
EU "neither played nor endeavoured to play a role in domestic change in 
the Soviet successor states" (Wolczuk, 2009, p. 187). The Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) framework and technical assistance under 
the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(TACIS) programme were basic and poorly targeted, the value dimension 
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was underdeveloped, and the relationship with Ukraine was secondary to 
those with the Central and East European countries (CEEC) and Russia.7 
 
Concerning the value package, the EU and the CoE pursue similar and in- 
disputably compatible agendas, with the rule of law firmly in both. The two 
actors fall in line as "European organisations" that represent "European val- 
ues", to the extent these can be identified. Adherence to the rule of law is a 
membership condition of both organisations, according to Article 49 of the 
consolidated Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and Article 3 of the Stat- 
ute of the Council of Europe respectively. Ukraine is a CoE member state, 
although norm compliance did not follow norm acceptance. Similarly, 
Ukraine aspires to become an EU member state, although its rhetorical 
commitment to the values shared by EU member states is not accompanied 
yet by practical commitment. While the CoE already missed an opportunity 
to apply pre-accession conditionality, the EU still has the power to do so, as 
analysed in this chapter. 
The concept of the rule of law is not exhaustively defined for the purposes 
of its promotion by either the CoE or the EU, and its exact meaning may 
seem fluid. Conversely, the EU, the CoE, the Venice Commission and the 
United Nations all advocate for the existence of a consensus on the core 
meaning of the rule of law and a shared pre-understanding of its essential, 
unquantifiable elements.8 A coherent directing idea that law should serve its 
social goals by coordinating social relations, minimising arbitrariness and 
 
 
7 In the mid-1990s, the EU concluded ten similar partnership and cooperation agree- 
ments with all post-Soviet states minus Belarus and the Baltic states. The aims of 
these partnerships are to provide a general framework for political dialogue, support 
new democracies and develop their market economies and provide a basis for co- 
operation in a number of fields. TACIS was launched as early as 1991 to speed and 
support the domestic developments. For an overview of TACIS, see Frenz (2007). 
8 See, for instance, European Commission Communication "A new EU Framework to 
strengthen the rule of law" (2014; also Annex); PACE Resolution "The principle of 
the rule of law" (1594/2007); Venice Commission "Report on the rule of law" (2011); 
UNGA Resolution "On the Declaration of the High-level meeting on the rule of law at 
the national and international levels" (A/Res/67/1, 2012) and Joint EU pledge for a 
High-level meeting at the UNGA, when the said resolution was adopted. EU officials 
repeatedly emphasised the existence of a consensual understanding of the rule of 
law in interviews. The ratio of the universal and the particular in European rule of 
law conceptions and human rights is debated in the literature (see Leino, 2002, 
2005; Leino & Petrov, 2009). 
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providing order in society provides the conceptual baseline on the rule of 
law (HIIL, 2007, p. 12; Tamanaha, 2007, p. 1). In relations with third states 
in the case of the EU and in relations with non-compliant states in the case 
of the CoE, this consensual understanding of the rule of law is common for 
the two organisations. In "A new EU framework to strengthen the rule of 
law" from March 2014, the European Commission stated explicitly that "as- 
pects of the rule of law as a common denominator of the Union are fully re- 
flected at the level of the Council of Europe" (Annex, p. 2). It ensures a de- 
gree of unity of their rule of law promotion efforts at a meta-level, notwith- 
standing differences in practical substantiation of the concept and areas of 
actual engagement analysed in the following section. 
Being a non-specialised organisation, the EU extensively relies on the CoE 
concerning the rule of law standards and the assessment of a country's 
compliance therewith. The CoE is better placed for the task of setting the 
standards and evaluating the performance both politically in terms of its 
mandate and membership (which translate into better legitimacy) and prac- 
tically in terms of its structures and expertise (which translate into monitor- 
ing tools and mechanisms). Moreover, the availability of CoE standards in a 
given area makes it easy for the EU to promote respective values. It is eas- 
ier politically, because it relieves the EU of a need to emphasise certain is- 
sues bilaterally, which often can put the relationship under (additional) 
strain. It is easier technically, because the EU can build on the CoE exper- 
tise in the field and, thereby, does not need to "reinvent the wheel". A senior 
EU official reiterated this point as follows: 
 
The Council of Europe is a point of reference, absolutely. It is there, with all the 
standards, and those standards are included in the Copenhagen Criteria. So, 
perfect! And it is very convenient for us to have it as a point of reference: it allows 
us to put less emphasis on certain issues ourselves, because it is being done 
anyway, through a different mechanism. 
 
In its programming documents, the EU operates widely with "European 
standards", directly or indirectly referring to the CoE and its elaborate net- 
works of treaties, to which Ukraine is usually a party.9 Similarly, in its report- 
 
 
 
9 Programming documents analysed include ENP policy papers, Country strategy 
papers, National indicative programmes, as well as Action Plans, Association Agen- 
das and Annual lists of priorities. 
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ing documents, the EU operates widely with Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) Resolutions, Venice Commission Opinions and 
reports of various monitoring bodies of the CoE.10 In fact, the dominance of 
the CoE and its standards in Ukraine was recognised also by non-European 
donors. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) Ukraine Rule of Law Project adopted the European model and fo- 
cused its activities on rule of law components present in the Universal and 
European codes of standards.11 
At the same time, the EU is enhancing its own competence. Although many 
questioned the appropriateness of the EU taking up a value promoting role, 
the EU "has assumed such a role regardless" (Greer & Williams, 2009, p. 
471). On the one hand, the EU is developing its own standards and "captur- 
ing the standard-setting tasks" of the CoE in certain areas (Kolb, 2010, p. 
8).12 On the other hand the EU engages in developing new European 
standards under the auspices of the CoE itself, through and alongside indi- 
vidual EU Member States. A European Commission official emphasised 
that the EU is actively involved in drafting new CoE Conventions, in order to 
ensure that the latter contain "European standards" which are compatible 
with EU legislation on the subject and which the EU wants to see as such. 
One of the objectives behind this is precisely to make these standards bind- 
ing on third state-partners of the EU that are CoE members. EU accession 
to the European Convention on Human Rights would increase EU leverage 
in the CoE forum further, making the EU a member of the Council of Europe 
in its own right, alongside the 28 EU Member States.13 
 
The CoE is said to perceive the tendency of the EU to take up new compe- 
tences and claim normative leadership as a threat, because there is "a fear 
 
 
10 Reporting documents analysed include Annual Country reports, as well as periodic 
ENP reviews and reports. 
11 Such as the Basic Principles of the Independence of Judiciary (UN GA Resolution 
40/146 (1985)) and the European Charter on the Statute for Judges (1998). 
12 In particular, the new EU framework on the rule of law from March 2014 is an at- 
tempt to consolidate the EU position on the rule of law (primarily for the purposes of 
internal affairs, but also for the purposes of external affairs). 
13 Discussed since late 1970s, EU accession to the ECHR is a legal obligation under 
the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 2). For the state of affairs, see: http://hub.coe.int/what- 
we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention. Legally, EU accession to the 
ECHR is considered highly problematic (see Greer & Williams, 2009). 
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of marginalization" of the CoE and its becoming a "standard-receiver" in- 
stead of a "standard-setter" (De Schutter, 2007, p. 3). The affirmation of its 
standard-setting role is still an important and sensitive issue for the CoE. 
For example, the Summary Report on Co-operation with the European Un- 
ion (Council of Europe, 2013a, p. 1) separately emphasises that "the exper- 
tise and benchmarking role of the Council of Europe in European Union pol- 
icies have been confirmed and even reinforced in the context of EU En- 
largement and Neighbourhood Policy", in particular in the area of rule of law 
promotion. In any case, regardless of how sceptical the CoE is of the EU 
approaching and engaging itself in the CoE core tasks, it is "unable to act 
independently anymore" and "has to align itself with these new EU stand- 
ards" (Kolb, 2010, p. 3). 
 
 
The area of engagement and operational overlap 
 
Due to its cross-cutting nature, its "connectedness", the rule of law "consti- 
tutes a kind of structural trap that bedevils reform efforts" in any area (Ta- 
manaha, 2011, pp. 214, 224). Just as all roads lead to Rome, progress in 
any area eventually hinges on the poor application of the rule of law in a 
country. However, speaking of the areas of actual engagement of the EU 
and the CoE, "rule of law promotion can only be on the agenda of these or- 
ganisations if it somehow falls within the mandate or contributes to the pur- 
pose of the organisation" (HIIL, 2007, p. 28). The CoE is concerned primari- 
ly with human rights and human security. In the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1950) and 200 other treaties that form the body of jus com- 
munis and in respective CoE development efforts, the rule of law features in 
relation to human rights and their protection by domestic courts (Council of 
Europe, 2006). The major activity of the CoE Office in Ukraine is targeted at 
the improvement of Ukraine's domestic legislation and capacity and at the 
enforcement of Ukraine's international commitments with regard to the pro- 
tection of human rights, and the functioning of the judiciary and law en- 
forcement institutions (Council of Europe, 2008; Council of Europe, 2013b). 
In terms of the object of reform, the rule of law promotion efforts of the 
CoE—as an intergovernmental organisation—focus first and foremost on 
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legislation to reform relevant institutional structures.14 The Venice Commis- 
sion is the key specialised agency and, to use the words of the former 
Judge at the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, "definitely enjoys the biggest 
influence and authority in Ukraine on constitutional issues".15 In turn, the 
European Court of Human Rights embodies "the fourth degree of jurisdic- 
tion" for Ukrainians and is defined as "the most active external change 
agent for the past ten years (even if its judgements did not concern 
Ukraine)" (Petrov & Serdyuk, 2008, p. 198).16 
As for the EU, the rule of law (or rather rule of law compliance) is relevant 
for virtually every EU policy area and sector of bilateral cooperation; a point 
stated explicitly in some EU documents and emphasised repeatedly in in- 
terviews.17 An official at the European External Action Service commented: 
"Well, it is difficult to see rule of law as a ‘sector', because elements of it are 
present in everything we do". Consequently, unlike the CoE which is a 
"niche player" in post-Soviet states (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2004, p. 
370), the EU pursues a holistic approach to rule of law promotion and refers 
to the rule of law for identification, authorisation, regulation and a variety of 
instrumental purposes.18 In EU framework (ENP) and bilateral (Ukraine) 
programming documents, the rule of law appears in relation to: the demo- 
cratic organisation of power and constitutional and electoral reforms; the 
system of justice and the functioning of judiciary and law enforcement insti- 
tutions; good governance and the functioning of public administration at all 
levels; the relationship between society and state, and human rights protec- 
tion; economic and social development; legislative adaptation of regulatory 
institutions, procedures and standards; and, finally, in relation to stability 
 
14 Kleinfeld (2012, Chapter 4) identifies four objects of rule of law promotion or reform: 
laws, institutions, power structures and social norms. 
15 Similar views were expressed by other Ukrainian experts. 
16 Ukrainians actively give recourse to the ECHR: a total of 56,427 applications have 
been submitted by Ukrainians as of January 1st, 2014, according to the Overview 
1959-2013 ECHR (see: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592013_E 
NG.pdf). Out of 717 court judgements, 709 are violation judgements, as of January 
1st, 2011 (see Ukraine country fact sheet, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Cou 
ntry_Factsheets_1959_2010_ENG.pdf). 
17 For example, it is stated in the National Indicative Programme for Ukraine 2011- 
2013 (p. 27). 
18 Walker (2009, p. 124) identifies the above four rule of law use-values or purposes, 
which the rule of law can be put to serve by the EU. 
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and security and the management of borders and migration, fighting organ- 
ised crime and corruption (Burlyuk, 2014a). Just as CoE efforts, EU rule of 
law promotion is targeted at transforming domestic legislative and institu- 
tional frameworks. 
Being a latecomer, the EU had to carve a place amongst the activities al- 
ready pursued by others. As a result, the EU cooperates with and even re- 
lies fully on other rule of law promoters as far as their understandings of the 
rule of law overlap and carries out its own activities as far as their under- 
standings diverge. Constitutional reform, the reform of the system of justice, 
public administration and protection of human rights are traditional areas for 
rule of law promoters. Hence, the EU cooperates closely with the CoE, as 
well as with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the USAID. The rule of law understood in relation to regulatory 
frameworks necessary for trade and investment is promoted by the EU and 
by the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment (EBRD) and others actors. At the same time, support for the adapta- 
tion of Ukrainian legislation to the EU acquis communautaire comes from 
the EU alone. Finally, the rule of law understood in relation to stability and 
security is promoted primarily by the EU (in cooperation with the OSCE), 
and no other rule of law promoter puts equal emphasis on border manage- 
ment, illegal migration and organised crime. Noteworthy, recent years have 
brought a reversal of the trend: external donors increasingly align their ac- 
tivities in Ukraine with the EU agenda, set out in Action Plans, Association 
Agendas and annual Lists of Priorities. This is because they recognise the 
special role of the EU due to Ukraine's European aspirations and because 
the EU agenda serves as a basis for Ukraine's national reform pro- 
grammes, often adopted as reactions to EU-Ukraine cooperation docu- 
ments (Wolczuk, 2009, p. 200). The Association Agreement between the 
EU and Ukraine concluded in parts in March and June 2014 makes up to 80 
per cent of the EU acquis communautaire obligatory for Ukraine and will in- 
flate the relevant weight of the EU and its standards, including on the rule of 
law.19 
 
 
 
 
 
19 The complete texts of the Association Agreement can be accessed at: http://eeas. 
europa.eu/ukraine/assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm. 
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Although both the CoE and the EU remain ambiguous over the precise 
scope of the rule of law, the core business of the CoE is clearer and nar- 
rower than that of the EU. EU rule of law promotion is broader and more all- 
encompassing, with less focus than that of the CoE, due to the EU's wider 
interests, mandates and ambitions.20 
 
 
"Mission civilisatrice" and political overlap 
 
In organisation theory, such substantive and operational overlap should 
generate competition and conflict (Grandori, 1987, p. 58; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003, p. 2). In practice, however, there is no apparent competition among 
different actors, and the rule of law promotion environment in Ukraine can 
be characterised as "friendly". Interviews uncovered a strong and seemingly 
genuine ambition of all parties to avoid duplication and to ensure compati- 
bility. In the absence of a structured government-led mechanism, semi- 
formal structures have been created to this end by rule of law promoters 
themselves. For example, the Ukraine Rule of Law Project (USAID) initiated 
regular monthly roundtables of all "activists" in the field of rule of law promo- 
tion; and the EU Delegation in Ukraine coordinates assistance cooperation 
with EU member states and other development partners. Consultation, co- 
ordination and even cooperation between various rule of law promoters in 
Ukraine, also non-European and non-governmental ones, can be observed. 
The "common product" in the form of joint publications, conferences and 
workshops confirms that such cooperation is not a mere imitation.21 None- 
theless, this coordination is more about stream-lining separate efforts than 
about working together: ultimately, they are distinct actors with their own 
agendas, budgets and procedures. 
The major reason for more cooperation than competition among different 
rule of law promoters in Ukraine in principle and the EU and the CoE in par- 
ticular is the political reality and the lack of interest, motivation and capacity 
for reform among local partners. Notwithstanding important differences in 
the established objectives of the two organisations, they pursue principally 
 
 
 
20 Greer and Williams (2009, p. 480) make a similar argument concerning human 
rights policies of the EU and the CoE. 
21 For example, a DVD "International standards for judiciary" (2010) in Ukrainian is a 
joint production of three rule of law promoters: the EU, the CoE and USAID. 
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the same mission civilisatrice, or "civilising mission", in Ukraine and in the 
post-Soviet space overall.22 Indeed, assessed against receiving states, the 
EU and the CoE have more in common than not. As discussed earlier, a 
shared pre-understanding of the essence of the rule of law exists in Europe. 
In the Report on the Rule of Law (Venice Commission, 2011, pp. 4–5), the 
Venice Commission explicitly stated that a consensual understanding of the 
essence of the rule of law is to be distinguished from a distorted, purely 
formalistic understanding as "rule by law", "rule by the law" or even "law by 
rules", found in some former socialist states.23 In the EU context, "we can 
be certain of at least one thing: an oppressive legal order cannot satisfy the 
EU's understanding of the rule of law" (Pech, 2012, p. 27). 
However, it remains a question whether the understanding of the rule of law 
in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states is the same, similar or at least re- 
ceptive of the European one. Ukraine declared a commitment to the rule of 
law through its Constitution (Articles 1 and 8) and, among other things, its 
membership in the CoE. Yet, norm acceptance did not translate into imme- 
diate norm compliance. Moreover, little to no improvement in Ukraine's rule 
of law compliance in the past two decades can be reported. In the World 
Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2011, Ukraine received low scores for all 
identified rule of law factors and sub-factors, ranking last or close to last 
globally, regionally and by income group (Agrast, Botero, & Ponce, 2011, 
pp. 100, 143).24 The systemic shortcomings are best captured by two para- 
doxes: the façade arrangement paradox and the Brownian motion paradox. 
The first means that, although spelled out thoroughly at the fundamental 
constitutional level, rule of law clauses fail drastically in reality. Thus, their 
role is reduced to a façade arrangement. The second means that, with a lot 
of movement overall, but no movement in a particular direction, rule of law 
reform processes in Ukraine resemble Brownian motion (Burlyuk, 2013, 
Chapter 7). 
 
 
22 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite (2004, p. 366) made a similar argument with respect to 
the OSCE and the CoE. 
23 Incidentally, the interviewed Venice Commission official revealed that this particular 
line was included upon the insistence of a Ukrainian delegate to the Venice Com- 
mission, with Ukraine and other post-Soviet states in mind. 
24 See also reports by KIIS (2006), Neill & Brooke (2008), Chebanenko, et al. (2011), 
and Allison (2012). 
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The reasons behind these paradoxes are deficiencies in all categories (or 
objects of rule of law reform)—laws, institutions, power structures and pro- 
fessional and popular social norms—and lie beyond the scope of this chap- 
ter. What is relevant here is the obstructive and infamous lack of political 
will for reform among Ukrainian elites. One of the risks of competition be- 
tween the two organisations is duplication and sending mixed signals to 
their Ukrainian partner institutions, which are often identical for different pro- 
jects. In the situation of limited interest, will and capacity for reform among 
local stakeholders, competition between the EU and the CoE would under- 
mine the effects of their efforts. Forum-shopping by local stakeholders is 
another risk of competition in the studied context: local authorities will readi- 
ly set the competing actors off against each other, exposing inconsistencies 
in their recommendations and expectations, interpreting these inconsisten- 
cies as signs of illegitimacy of the recommendations and expectations and 
so justifying the domestic status quo and their own inaction. 
So, the main competition of the EU and the CoE is not with each other, but 
with the unwillingness of the domestic government to reform. Their common 
purpose, or "mission", is to promote a European understanding of the rule 
of law in Ukraine. Therefore, the EU and the CoE usually take similar politi- 
cal stances vis-à-vis Ukraine in cases of severe rule of law violations, as the 
recent cases of the Tymoshenko trials in 2010–2013 and repressions 
against Euromaidan protesters in 2013–2014 illustrate. 
 
 
Limited resources and complementary comparative advantages 
 
The sheer limitedness of donor resources (political, financial and human) in 
Ukraine further inclines the EU and the CoE to cooperate. Indeed, coopera- 
tion and complementarity with others is one of the ways for an international 
organisation to enhance its own effectiveness (Brummer, 2010, pp. 292– 
294).25 By pooling resources, the EU and the CoE try to maximise their im- 
pact and avoid the waste of resources through "turf battle" (Kolb, 2010, p. 
4). The Memorandum of Understanding (Council of Europe, 2003, p. 3) 
acknowledges this explicitly and states that the organisations will "take due 
account of the comparative advantages, the respective competences and 
 
 
25 Other ways, such as increasing the incentives or the scale of support, are beyond 
the scope of this study. 
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expertise" of each other. All development actors cooperate with each other 
to some extent. However, the relationship between the EU and the CoE is 
special, and even the interviewed experts spoke of them as key and even 
natural partners. This section revisits the particularly compatible compara- 
tive advantages that give rise to this relationship. 
On the one hand, the EU-CoE cooperation is believed to enhance signifi- 
cantly the role of the CoE, linking it to the EU, an organisation with bigger 
strategic importance and larger funds (Kolb, 2010, p. 2; Merlingen & Os- 
trauskaite, 2004, p. 396). Compliance with the rule of law is a condition for 
membership in both the CoE and the EU. In the uncertain yet enthusiastic 
political context of the early 1990s, accession to the CoE was dominated by 
presumptions that "compliance could be achieved within a reasonable time- 
frame with the good will of governments" and that "admission would result 
in a continuing and indeed much stronger influence of the CoE than would 
be the case if the country were not a member" (Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004, 
p. 99; Djeric, 2000, p. 610). As a result, admission procedures were rather 
flexible. Ukraine and other post-Soviet states became CoE members de- 
spite their poor compliances (Jordan, 2003, pp. 667, 679). Given the wast- 
ed opportunity to apply pre-accession conditionality and its political weak- 
ness as an intergovernmental organisation, the CoE has few means to im- 
pose compliance at this point. It has the power to suspend membership of a 
country in violation of its principles, but is reluctant to do so. Ukraine was 
threatened with suspension twice, in 2000 and 2001. However, neither 
Ukraine, nor any other state, has been disowned yet. The Council of Eu- 
rope has the monitoring tools, but rarely acts upon the monitoring results 
(Brummer, 2010, p. 281). Usually, the CoE does not go beyond diplomatic 
"naming and shaming" through Venice Commission's opinions and recom- 
mendations, PACE resolutions or CoE reports. It has vast tasks and aims, 
but its financial resources are "relatively modest" (Benoit-Rohmer & Klebes, 
2005, p. 22). Nevertheless, it does enjoy significant socialising potential vis- 
à-vis Ukraine. 
The EU, in turn, has the potential to induce policy change through the in- 
centives of political and economic integration with the Union and has larger 
development funds to assist in policy change. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the mega-incentive of membership is not on the table, Ukraine's EU mem- 
bership aspirations distinguish it from most other post-Soviet states and 
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give the EU stronger political leverage in Ukraine than elsewhere in the re- 
gion. Moreover, Ukraine's aspirations for EU membership give new rele- 
vance to CoE standards: they become significant not only as standards of 
the CoE itself, but also as pre-conditions for EU membership. Although the 
CoE may be displeased with such subservient political placement, its posi- 
tion as "an antechamber or waiting room for EU accession" in reality en- 
hances its relevance (Joris & Vandenberghe, 2009, p. 13). Technical and 
financial assistance funds ten or more times the size of those of the CoE 
give the EU undisputed financial leadership.26 There are examples of joint 
projects funded by the EU for 50, 80, 90 and 100 per cent. In 2012, EU con- 
tribution amounted to 89 per cent of the total budget of Joint Programmes. 
(Council of Europe, 2013) 
 
On the other hand, having the CoE on board is advantageous for the EU. 
Incidentally, in interviews, the importance of the EU for the CoE was em- 
phasised mostly by EU officials, whereas the importance of the CoE for the 
EU was underlined by EU and CoE officials, as well as independent ex- 
perts. Despite its relative political and financial weakness, overlooking or 
reducing the role of the CoE to "a large footnote" is unjustified (MacMullen, 
2004, p. 406). Most decisively, the Council of Europe possesses the neces- 
sary competence in terms of both the mandate of the organisation and the 
accumulated institutional memory, expertise, knowledge, know-how and 
experience. The wide membership (encompassing 47 states, including 28 
EU Member States and all European partners of the EU apart from Belarus) 
gives CoE standards, activities and opinions an unparalleled degree of le- 
gitimacy. In this way, CoE standards are representative, relevant and bind- 
ing at the same time, while they are also tighter and stronger than those of 
the United Nations as the universal organisation. By complying, member 
states' governments gain a sort of legitimacy themselves. Unlike the EU, 
whose relationship with Ukraine evolves within a highly ambiguous political 
paradigm, the CoE is an organisation of which Ukraine is currently a mem- 
ber. Ukraine has binding treaty obligations resulting from its membership in 
 
 
26 The total amounts of allocated development assistance can be found in EU National 
Indicative Programmes and Annual Action Programmes for Ukraine for respective 
years. Although it is difficult to isolate the amount of money directed at rule of law 
promotion as such, it is obvious that the amount is significantly larger than that of 
the CoE. 
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the organisation, including on the rule of law. Even though the political and 
legal weight of these membership commitments may be questioned, the 
CoE, its activities and requests enjoy a certain degree of formal authority in 
Ukraine. Ukraine's official rhetoric remains at all times respectful of the 
CoE, its recommendations, reports and statements and maintains the im- 
age of Ukraine's willingness to comply with its membership commitments 
(unlike Russia, for instance27). Furthermore, the formal relationship in place 
between the CoE and Ukraine allows the CoE to engage in Ukraine's do- 
mestic political processes in its own capacity, while at the same time pro- 
vides a tool for domestic actors to use in domestic debates. For example, 
Venice Commission opinions and recommendations are an important ex- 
ternal reference point for domestic actors.28 A Venice Commission official 
revealed in interview that the Secretariat receives occasional requests from 
Ukrainian politicians to provide a recommendation on legislative drafts that 
normally would be outside of its competence, so as to obtain an authorita- 
tive opinion as a tool in domestic debates. 
All this makes the CoE more than just another body for implementing EU- 
funded projects, which in the case of EU-CoE cooperation are framed with 
the Joint Programmes mechanism. The input of the CoE is significant al- 
ready because it is often the one bringing the initiative and responsible for 
developing the content of a project and its implementation once approved.29 
Moreover, "having the Council of Europe on board opens many doors and 
guarantees better receptiveness on the Ukrainian side", to quote an officer 
from the EU Delegation to Ukraine. Precisely because Ukraine is a member 
of the CoE, the EU often chooses the latter as an implementer for projects 
dealing with the state of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in 
Ukraine. As an expert with 10 years of experience in monitoring develop- 
 
 
27 In the recent years, Russian officials stated publicly Russia's dissatisfaction with the 
treatment it received from the CoE and warned that Russia would revise its own atti- 
tude all the way to withdrawal. 
28 Over 70 Venice Commission Opinions on various Ukrainian laws and legislative ini- 
tiatives have been issued since 1995, yet before Ukraine joined the Venice Com- 
mission in 1997. The recurring themes include constitutional reform, judicial reform, 
electoral legislation, legislation on prosecution, creation of a professional associa- 
tion of lawyers and, more recently, legislation on the right to assembly. 
29 See Joris & Vandenberghe (2009, pp. 23-24) for an overview of the operation of 
Joint Programmes. 
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ment projects in Ukraine observed, "such joint projects become a mecha- 
nism of indirect control over Ukraine's compliance with its obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights". The intergovernmental nature 
of the CoE allows it to carry out projects in sensitive areas that cannot be 
entrusted with private company-implementers. A variety of Joint CoE/EU 
Programmes in Ukraine deal precisely with transparency, independence 
and efficiency of the judicial system, ill-treatment and impunity, money 
laundering and terrorist financing. Projects in these areas require a high 
level of political and operational coordination on the part of Ukrainian part- 
ner institutions, as well as access to places of detention or disclosure of in- 
formation that is otherwise not public. Therefore, Ukrainian partners are 
more inclined to cooperate with a project backed by the authority of the CoE 
rather than with a private company-implementer. In addition, the CoE is a 
full structure, with binding conventions and other legislation, specialised 
agencies and institutions, monitoring bodies and evaluative information, 
trained staff and experts, long-standing presence in the field and links with 
domestic structures and elites. It simply possesses the necessary experi- 
ence and trained experts to implement the projects, which make it "better 
understood" among Ukrainian professionals, as experts stated in interviews. 
Finally, as intergovernmental organisations, the CoE and the EU have simi- 
lar public statuses and decision-making procedures. This institutional com- 
patibility, high levels of formality and rules of transparency create an at- 
mosphere of trust between them (higher than among other rule of law pro- 
moters) and make them "fully reliable" partners, to quote an official from the 
European Commission's Directorate-General for Development and Cooper- 
ation. Nonetheless, the intergovernmental nature of the EU and the CoE 
has some negative implications at the operational level, as the actual de- 
velopment projects coordinated by them are extremely formal, bureaucratic 
and, consequently, slow. 
The extensive cooperation of the EU and the CoE at the operational level 
mediates the perceived visibility of their involvement, visibility understood 
as the degree of awareness of an actor on the part of partner countries and 
the ease (or difficulty) with which this actor is identified among other exter- 
nal actors who have their own reform strategies (Bendiek, 2008, p. 4). The 
CoE was traditionally more familiar to domestic audiences in Ukraine and 
served more frequently as a point of reference and a tool of influence in 
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domestic public debates. Although the EU lagged behind for a better part of 
the past two decades, the intensity and visibility of its involvement in the 
rule of law promotion business in Ukraine is gradually (and ever more 
quickly) increasing. Since 2005, the EU has intensified political dialogue 
and cooperation with Ukraine and enlarged the scale of technical and finan- 
cial assistance provided to its rule of law reform processes. Actually, the EU 
is said to have finally overcome the USA as Ukraine's largest donor.30 As a 
result, the EU is more frequently brought up in the domestic debate on the 
subject by politicians, journalists and analysts. However, in interviews, ex- 
perts working in the sphere of legal reforms still named the Venice Com- 
mission and the European Court of Human Rights as external authorities in 
the field, not the EU. The fact that the EU is more of a financial partner than 
an implementing one under the Joint Programmes cooperation mechanism 
reduces the visibility of its rule of law promotion in Ukraine as the benefi- 
ciary country.31 
 
 
Political and operational reality as triggers of institutional cooperation 
 
An important observation is that the inevitability of cooperation between the 
EU and the CoE at the political and operational levels precedes and even 
triggers their cooperation at the institutional level. The two rule of law pro- 
moters work in the same field (Ukraine), deal with the same set of problems 
(domestic institutional context) and interact with the same counterparts (lo- 
cal stakeholders). Combined with the limitedness of donor resources and 
the lack of interest, motivation and capacity among their local partners, this 
reality prompts policy and institutional changes on the part of the EU and 
the CoE to formalise and professionalise their actual cooperation on the 
ground. 
Indeed, looking retrospectively, the ever increasing cooperation between 
the two organisations has been institutionalised and formalised over the 
years with hesitation; a process that has been slow, based on reaction 
 
 
 
30 The above statement on the EU being the largest donor in Ukraine is based on the 
statements and calculations by the EU itself, for example, in Country Strategy Paper 
2007-2013 (p. 9) or in the Manuscript published by the Delegation of the EC to 
Ukraine in 2009 (p. 1). 
31 Joris & Vandenberghe (2009, p. 24) make a general argument of a kind. 
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more than action, and constantly yielding to operational realities.32 The two 
sets of letters that the EU and the CoE exchanged on June 16th, 1987 and 
November 5th, 1996 were replaced on May 23rd, 2007 by the Memorandum 
of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Un- 
ion.33 Yet, "the two organizations have not been over-zealous": the Memo- 
randum confirmed the existing relationship rather than introduced genuine 
novelties (Joris & Vandenberghe, 2009, pp. 35–37). Moreover, the Memo- 
randum was less ambitious than the one called for in the Report of Jean- 
Claude Juncker "Council of Europe—European Union: A sole ambition for 
the European continent" on April 11th, 2006.34 Similarly, although EU/CoE 
Joint Programmes have been in operation since 1993, a Joint Declaration 
on cooperation and partnership between the Council of Europe and the Eu- 
ropean Commission was adopted only on the 3rd of April, 2001.35 Most re- 
cently, on April 1st, 2014, ten years into the European Neighbourhood Poli- 
cy, the EU and the CoE signed a "Statement of Intent" establishing a new 
framework for cooperation in the EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Re- 
gions for the period 2014–2020.36 As it is described in a press release 
(IP/14/356) this 5-page "administrative agreement" sets out working meth- 
ods to strengthen their "strategic and programmatic", or "political and opera- 
tional", cooperation in the region.37 
The planned review of the Memorandum in 2013 celebrated "a quasi- 
routine of policy co-ordination on issues of common interests" that took 
shape and concluded that there was no need to review the Memorandum at 
that point (Council of Europe, 2013) . Yet, many of the ideas suggested in 
Juncker's Report in 2006 as necessary and even urgent for efficient EU- 
 
32 See  Benoit-Rohmer  &  Klebes  (2005,  pp.  127-135)  and  Joris  &  Vandenberghe 
(2009) for an overview of the institutionalisation of EU-CoE relations over the years. 
33 See an overview of the legal basis of EU-CoE cooperation at: http://www.coe.int/t/de 
r/eu_EN.asp. 
34 For Juncker's final recommendations, see pp. 30-32 of the Report. 
35 The CoE/EU Joint Programmes exist since 1993 and in Ukraine since 1995, alt- 
hough the actual activities started in 2001. At the time of writing, there have been 
about 20 projects carried out in/for Ukraine, with 5 of them closely related to the rule 
of law. See: http://www.jp.coe.int/Default.asp. 
36 A Statement of Intent for the cooperation between the Council of Europe and the 
European Commission in the EU Enlargement region and the Eastern Partnership 
and Southern Mediterranean countries (EU Neighbourhood region), April 1st, 2014. 
37 Both phrases are used in the text of the Statement. 
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CoE cooperation, including EU accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, have not materialised so far. Although facilitated by the CoE 
Liaison Office in Brussels and recent restructuring of the CoE, their institu- 
tional cooperation remains lop-sided: the EU holds a special status in the 
CoE and may attend meetings of its institutions and agencies, but not the 
other way around (Benoit-Rohmer & Klebes, 2005, pp. 44, 131). As 
acknowledged in the Memorandum itself (Council of Europe, 2003, p. 5), 
the EU and the CoE are different organisations and retain their decision- 
making autonomies. However, the competition between them is concentrat- 
ed largely at the institutional level, and even here it eventually gives way to 
cooperation under the pressure of political and operational reality, which 
bends the reluctant institutional structures of the two organisations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the relationship between the EU and the CoE as rule 
of law promoters in Ukraine as an instance of European value promotion in 
post-Soviet states. The findings reveal three important nuances (and per- 
haps even general tendencies) that enrich our understanding of the studied 
relationship, namely that cooperation prevails over competition, political and 
operational cooperation precedes and triggers institutional level coopera- 
tion, and the EU has recently strengthened its position vis-à-vis the CoE. 
First, in this country (Ukraine) and policy area (the rule of law), cooperation 
between the EU and the CoE prevails over competition. Significant overlap 
of substantive, political and operational agendas of the two organisations in 
practice leads to cooperation and not competition, as theory would expect. 
Given the persistently low rule of law compliance levels in Ukraine and re- 
luctance of the Ukrainian authorities to reform, the main competition of the 
EU and the CoE is with the country's government, not with each other. The 
limitedness of their political, financial and human resources further inclines 
the EU and the CoE to capitalise on the complementarity of their compara- 
tive advantages so as to maximise effects from their efforts. Competition is 
not altogether absent, but it is concentrated at (and perhaps even restricted 
to) the institutional level. 
The second nuance is that cooperation at the political and operational lev- 
els precedes and even triggers cooperation at the institutional level. The 
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institutions of both organisations are slow, reluctant and reactive in formalis- 
ing cooperation that exists in practice. However, institutional competition 
also eventually gives way to cooperation. Third, the EU has strengthened 
its position in the last decade and claims leadership from the CoE: as a 
richer organisation it has taken financial leadership; as a politically stronger 
organisation with more incentives to offer it is fighting for political leader- 
ship; and as an organisation with a broader rule of law agenda it may even- 
tually challenge the CoE's normative leadership. The understanding of the 
EU as "a payer, not a player", dominant in the 1990s and early 2000s, is 
losing relevance as multiple political processes continually shift the balance 
in favour of the EU. At the same time, the role of the CoE should not be re- 
duced to a footnote or entirely overlooked in the analyses of value promo- 
tion in post-Soviet states, which are often limited to investigations of EU ef- 
forts. In this country (Ukraine) and policy area (the rule of law), the CoE re- 
tains special relevance, both in its own capacity and as an implementer of 
the (joint) projects of the EU. 
The findings of this study are specific to the examined case, EU and CoE 
rule of law promotion in Ukraine, but can be generalised to the wider phe- 
nomenon of EU and CoE value promotion in post-Soviet states albeit with 
certain limitations. In the first place, it is difficult to speak of "post-Soviet 
states" as a group today, more than two decades after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. Even categorising them into sub-groups, such as the ENP 
East, South Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia, would be problematic. All 
states have followed individual transformation paths, and their domestic 
contexts and relationships with the EU and the CoE are qualitatively differ- 
ent. This inevitably affects the political leverage of the two organisations 
over domestic processes in the countries and, eventually, over each other 
as value promoters in each. In the second place, meaningful variation in the 
EU-CoE relationship across policy areas can be expected. The value agen- 
das and mandates of the two organisations vary across policy fields, and 
thus the nature, degree and impact of substantive and operational overlap 
also differs.38 However, one can conclude with a reasonable degree of cer- 
tainty that similar general tendencies in the EU-CoE relationship are in 
 
 
 
38 The significance of the political context, policy area, and internal and external coor- 
dination for variation in EU external policies is analysed in Burlyuk (2014c). 
198 OLGA BURLYUK  
 
 
 
place across countries and policy areas, namely: the presence of both co- 
operation and competition; the dominance of cooperation at substantive, 
political and operational levels, and the prevalence of competition at the in- 
stitutional level; the determining role of the reluctance of partner states to 
reform and the limitedness of donor resources; and finally, the ever stronger 
position of the EU as compared to the CoE on all accounts—normative, po- 
litical, and financial. Future research should engage in within-case and 
comparative studies (with comparison across countries and policy areas) in 
order to see the variety of formats of the EU-CoE relationship and the 
scope of generalisation of the findings of this study. 
As for policy implications, the interconnectedness and interdependence of 
the EU and the CoE and their rule of law promotion efforts is apparent. It is 
highly unlikely that the process of assuming competences by the EU will be 
reversed, the overlap in mandates will be eliminated, identical membership 
will be achieved, one organisation will be completely replaced by the other 
or that the two will merge. There is no alternative but to develop better co- 
operation mechanisms and explore the complementarities between the two 
organisations further. In view of the significant and ever growing substan- 
tive, institutional and operational overlap, as well as the commonality of 
challenges addressed and faced, consultation between the EU and the CoE 
is a minimum requirement, while coordination and cooperation are desirable 
and appropriate ways to advance their value agendas.39 If not automaticity, 
then at least effectively functioning mechanisms to realise this cooperation 
should be in place. Future policy should acknowledge the effective coopera- 
tion between the two actors that exists on the ground and work on institu- 
tional mechanisms to formalise, improve and facilitate this cooperation. 
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